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Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and 
higher economic growth?  This paper tests hypotheses of the theoretical literature that 
results of decentralization depend on features of political institutions.  Using data from up 
to 95 countries for 25 years we show that the effect of fiscal decentralization strongly 
depends on two aspects of political centralization: 1) strength of national party system 
(measured by the age of main parties and fractionalization of government parties) and 2) 
subordination (whether local and state executives are appointed or elected).  We find 
solid support for Riker’s theory (1964): in developing countries, strong parties 
significantly improve the results of fiscal decentralization for economic growth, quality 
of government, and public goods provision.  There is also some evidence from 
developing countries that administrative subordination of local to higher-level authorities 
improves decentralization results. 
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1 1.  Introduction 
Modern economic literature has little doubt that economic decentralization affects 
the quality of government, economic growth, and efficiency of public goods provision.  
The effect of decentralization depends on economic and political incentives of local 
public officials.  Economic incentives that help to align politicians’ private interests with 
public goals are provided by such mechanisms as interjurisdictional competition 
(Tiebout, 1956; Qian and Roland, 1998; Maskin, Qian, and Xu, 2000) and  fiscal 
autonomy (Jin et al., 1999; Qian and Weingast, 1997; and Zhuravskaya, 2000).  Political 
incentives, i.e., local governments’ accountability, are provided by political institutions, 
which ensure that careers of local politicians depend on whether they pursue efficient 
policies.  In the absence of accountability, strong economic incentives at the local level 
may result in corruption, provincial protectionism, and capture by vested interests (Tanzi, 
1996; Sonin, 2003, Cai and Treisman, 2004). 
Even though it is a well-established fact that accountability of local public 
officials is necessary to prevent inefficient local policies in a decentralized economy, 
there is little agreement in the literature about what institutions can effectively ensure 
accountability.
1  On the one hand, democratic elections with free access to information 
and developed civil society may provide local governments with sufficient political 
incentives to guarantee efficient decentralization.  This argument is based on the view 
that local governments are more accountable compared to the central governments 
(Seabright, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 2000); and that they have to compete during 
elections on more concrete policy issues compared to the central governments where 
                                                 
1 See Bardhan (2002) for an excellent survey of the literature. 
  2many dimensions of policies are bundled together  (Besley and Coate, 2003).  On the 
other hand, democratic mechanisms fail in many developing and transition countries, 
leading to corruption and capture of the local governments.  In addition, local 
governments accountable only to local constituencies in decentralized states have 
incentives to pursue policies that have negative externalities on other jurisdictions of the 
country, i.e. issuing money surrogates, erecting trade barriers, etc. (Musgrave, 1969; 
Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 1996; Besley and Coate, 2003).  In these cases, strong administrative 
control of local by central authorities may help efficient economic decentralization 
(Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000).  Beneficial effect of administrative centralization, 
however, requires lower probability of capture at the national compared to the local 
level.
2  Riker (1964) pointed out that the structure of party system is also extremely 
important for the effectiveness of local governments.  He argued that strong national 
party systems mitigate externalities from local policies and are more affective in 
disciplining local politicians than administrative or constitutional arrangements.  Thus, 
decentralization may have the opposite results in countries with different sources of local 
governments’ accountability.
3
This paper sheds light on this debate by evaluating the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on the quality of government, public goods provision, and economic 
growth, taking into account the structure of political institutions.  In particular, we 
analyze how the level of political centralization changes the results of fiscal 
decentralization.  Previous empirical literature on the effects of decentralization produced 
                                                 
2 Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) studied determinants of capture in different levels of government. 
3 Besley and Case (1995) provide evidence of influence of political parties on accountability using panel 
data for the US states. 
  3mixed results that vary with countries and time periods.
4  This can be partly explained by 
the fact that it overlooked the importance of political institutions. 
Using data from up to 95 countries for 25 years, we show that the effect of 
decentralization on economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision 
strongly depends on the following two aspects of political centralization: 1) strength of 
the party system (measured by the age of main parties and fractionalization of 
government parties) and 2) administrative subordination (whether local and province-
level politicians are appointed or elected).  We find solid support for Riker’s theory in 
developing and transition countries: strong party systems substantially improve the 
results of fiscal decentralization.  In contrast, opposite to Riker’s prediction in developed 
countries decreased age of main parties increases efficiency of decentralization, while 
results based on government fractionalization are unrobust. The negative effect of party 
age can be attributed to a decrease in political competition at the national level.  In 
addition, we find some evidence that subordination of local authorities to higher-level 
governments improves the effect of decentralization on growth and public goods 
provision both in developing and developed countries and on government quality in 
developing countries.  Most of the results come from cross-section of countries. 
                                                 
4 Fisman and Gatti (2002) and de Mello and Barenstein (2001) found negative effect of decentralization on 
corruption; Treisman (2000) reported no relationship.  Zhang and Zou (1998) reported negative effect of 
decentralization on provincial growth in China.  Jin et al. (1999) showed that this relationship is positive 
once one filters out cyclical effects.  Lin and Liu (2000) confirmed this result.  Akai and Sakata (2002) 
reported positive effect of decentralization on growth of US states in early 1990s.  Xie et al. (1999) showed 
no long-term relationship between these variables in the US for 50 years.  Woller and Phillips (1998) found 
no link between decentralization and growth in developing countries.  In contrast, Davoodi and Zou (1998) 
reported negative, marginally significant, relationship in developing countries and no effect in developed 
countries.  Robalino et al. (2001) found negative cross-country relationship between decentralization and 
infant mortality.  Zhuravskaya (2000) reported positive effect of decentralization on healthcare and 
education outcomes in Russian municipalities. 
  4Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that unobserved cross-country heterogeneity 
accounts for the results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents 
hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 describes the methodology.  In 
section 5, we present the results and discuss their robustness.  In section 6, we summarize 
and interpret our empirical findings.  Conclusions follow in section 7. 
2.  Hypotheses and the measures of political institutions 
The theoretical argument first made by Riker (1964)  that party systems - the 
strength of national parties and the relationship between the national and subnational 
parties – are important determinants of political incentives of the local governments, is 
behind our first hypothesis.  In the case of strong political parties, career of politicians in 
the local government depends on their party’s political and financial support to get 
reelected, as well as on the possibility of promotion to the national government.  National 
governing parties, in turn, are interested in supporting local politicians whose policies do 
not impose significant negative externalities on other jurisdictions in the country, and, 
thus, on overall national performance.  Therefore, strong parties provide political 
incentives for local politicians to conduct efficient policies and help to internalize 
externalities of local policies.
5  Moreover, strong national party systems provide political 
incentives for local governments irrespective of whether local politicians are appointed or 
elected.  Even when local politicians do not need support during elections, career 
concerns play an important role (Maskin, Qian, and Xu, 2000). 
                                                 
5 This effect, however, may be attenuated by a weak link between national and regional parties when 
national parties do not have much influence over regional politicians.  Uslaner (2000) argues that Canada 
provides an example of weak link between national and regional parties.  The data available do not allow us 
to take into account the relationship between national and regional parties. 
  5The best available proxies for the strength of party systems are the age of main 
parties (the average age of the two main governmental parties and the main opposition 
party) and fractionalization of governing parties (the probability that two members of 
parliament picked at random from governing parties belong to different parties).  An 
assumption behind the first measure is that older parties are stronger than younger ones 
(Huntington, 1968).  Higher age of main parties indicates more stable party system 
important for career concerns because local politicians take the stability of their party into 
account when making decisions on effort allocation to career advancement.   An 
assumption behind the second measure is that low fractionalization of government parties 
indicates that government consists of a small number of strong parties each having 
substantial weight in policy decisions, while high fractionalization is an indicator of 
many relatively weak parties each having small impact on policies.  The motivation 
behind this measure is that the relative political weight of local politician’s party in 
national policy-making is an important factor in his career decisions.
6
Both of these measures are highly imperfect.  The age of main parties may reflect 
institution building processes in young countries (that can affect decentralization 
outcomes) rather than the party strength.  Fractionalization of government parties as a 
measure of party strength has even more serious drawbacks.  First, the differences in 
fractionalization of parties across countries depend on differences in the degree of 
geographical segregation of voters with different political preferences (for instance, 
ethnic groups).  Efficiency of fiscal decentralization may also be affected by geographical 
                                                 
6 We take fractionalization of governing parties rather than fractionalization of parliament as one of the two 
main proxies for the party strength because it is more closely related to career concerns.  Fractionalization 
in small opposition parties and the number of independent members of parliament has little effect on local 
politicians’ career concerns determined by political weights of their parties.  Nonetheless, the results are 
robust to using fractionalization of parliament as an alternative proxy. 
  6voter segregation because in countries with high regional segregation decentralization is 
partly driven by central government’s attempts to appease secessionist tendencies.   
Second, government fractionalization depends on the electoral rule and government 
system, both of which can have an independent effect on the efficiency of 
decentralization.  Empirical strategies used to do make sure that our results are not driven 
by these alternative explanations are described in the sensitivity section 5.1. 
To the best of our knowledge there is little quantitative comparative analysis of 
the strength of party systems, thus, it is hard to check whether the average age of main 
parties and fractionalization of government parties serve as good measures of party-
system strength across countries. Literature, however, provides some estimates of over-
time changes in the strength of parties for several countries. Therefore, we are able to 
check whether reported changes in the strength of party systems are reflected in behavior 
of our measures. For example, Mexico and Peru in 1990’s experienced a substantial 
decline in party strength. A large number of independent candidates and candidates from 
recently formed new parties were elected as mayors, governors, and legislators (Camp, 
1998; Carrion, 1998). Our data shows a significant decrease in the average age of main 
parties and a significant increase in the fractionalization of government parties in both 
countries at that time.  Thus, in these cases our measures adequately capture the change 
in party strength.  As is usual for cross-country comparisons, there are few countries for 
which the two measures perform very poorly as proxies of party strength, however.
7
                                                 
7 Colombia, for example, has relatively low level of fractionalization and the highest average age of parties 
in the world. Under our assumptions this indicates a very strong party system. In reality, Colombia has one 
of the weakest party systems, since parties do not have control over their own party label which allows 
existence of different lists with the same party label. This is, however, a unique phenomenon to Colombia 
and neighboring Ecuador (Roland and Zapata, 2000). 
  7We formulate testable prediction of Riker’s theory:  Young age of main parties 
and high fractionalization of government parties reduce efficiency of decentralization 
affecting economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision outcomes. 
An excessively strong party system can, however, be an indication of low political 
competition.  In this case few parties (in the extreme case, only one party) dominate 
elections and constituencies have lower influence on the election outcome.  In particular, 
when political competition is low, national parties become less concerned about the 
negative externalities of local policies pursued by party members.  As a result, under 
certain conditions efficiency of fiscal decentralization may be reduced in a system with 
excessively strong parties.  Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2003) argue that Mexico between 1930s 
and early 1990s provides an example of inefficiently small political competition.
8  This 
logic points to the alternative hypothesis that the age of main parties and low government 
fractionalization may undermine the efficiency of decentralization. 
Argentina and Chile provide a good case study: both counties experienced fiscal 
decentralization with a substantial difference in outcomes.  In the 1980s and 1990s, about 
10% of total government revenues and expenditures were shifted from central to 
subnational budgets in Chile and 15% in Argentina.  The level of decentralization, of 
course, has been substantially higher in federal Argentina that in unitary Chile.  It is well 
documented that in Chile transfer of expenditure responsibilities and financial resources 
from the central to municipal governments helped to improve provision of public health 
(Bossert et al., 2003) and education (Winkler and Rounds, 1996; Parry, 1997).  In 
                                                 
8 High age of parties may also indicate reduced accountability because it may reflect extremely loyal 
electorate that votes for the party regardless of its actual policies.  Shachar (2003) studies the party loyalty 
of electorate. 
  8contrast, Argentine decentralization is viewed as one of the main reasons for 
macroeconomic destabilization and a large-scale economic crisis (Tommasi et al., 2001).  
This difference in the results of decentralization can be explained by the difference in 
levels of political centralization and national party strength of the two countries.  Chile 
has strong party system with parties that are national in scope and have clear ideological 
distinctions (Londregan, 2000).  National party affiliation in Chile is important not only 
for elections and career concerns of government officials at all levels, but it also plays an 
important role in NGOs such as universities and labor unions.  In contrast, Argentine 
national political parties are weak and provincial parties dominate political arena both at 
the national and provincial level (Corrales, 2002).  Thus, in Argentina, national political 
parties do not serve as a mechanism for disciplining subnational authorities and aligning 
incentives of local politicians with national objectives, while in Chile they do. 
A basic premise of the representative democracy paradigm is that public officials 
should be elected.  There are different views in the literature, however, on whether 
elections of local officials help the outcomes of decentralization.  Seabright (1996) shows 
that under certain assumptions elected officials at the local level are more accountable 
compared to the central level.  His conjecture motivates a testable proposition that the 
effect of decentralization on economic growth, quality of government, and public goods 
provision is better in the case of elected provincial and municipal executives compared to 
the case when they are appointed.   
Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) built a model to illustrate that in transition 
economies the results of economic decentralization may conversely depend on presence 
of local elections.  An assumption behind their argument is that central governments have 
  9higher incentives to promote economic growth than local governments, as the latter are 
more likely to be captured.
9  In addition, direct administrative subordination internalizes 
externalities from local policies.  This logic implies that the outcomes of decentralization 
would be better in the case of appointed provincial and municipal executives compared to 
the case when they are elected.  Blanchard and Shleifer argued that the reason for why 
decentralization has become a major growth-promoting factor in China and an obstacle to 
growth in Russia is the difference in political centralization of these countries:  In China 
decentralization has taken place under a tight administrative control of the communist 
party, while in Yeltsin’s Russia economic decentralization was accompanied by large-
scale political decentralization. 
We test Seabright’s and Blanchard and Shleifer’s theories against each other 
using dummy variables that tell whether municipal and provincial executives are elected 
or appointed as measures of the administrative side of political centralization.
10
3.  Data 
We use data on political institutions, fiscal decentralization, government 
performance, economic growth, outcomes of public goods provision, and various control 
variables for up to 95 countries for the years 1975-2000.
11  Not all the variables are 
available for all countries and all years: some regressions cover as few as 50 countries.  
The definitions and the sources of all variables are given in Table A2 in appendix. 
                                                 
9 This is a strong assumption (see discussion in Bardhan, 2002).  Nonetheless, one can argue that 
competition for influence on authorities under certain distributions of wealth between and within federal 
jurisdictions may be much tougher at the central level than at the local level.  This means that competition 
on the national market for capture can substantially reduce captors’ rents leading to breakdown of capture 
market at the national level, while monopolistic rents of local captors remain intact. 
10 Choice between appointing and electing a local public official is a special case of choosing between 
delegating tasks to bureaucrat or politician (Alesina and Tabellini, 2003). 
11 The list of countries that constitute our sample is given in Table A1 in appendix. 
  10Summary statistics and correlations between the variables are also presented in appendix 
(Tables A3 and A4). 
As the main measure of fiscal decentralization we use the share of subnational 
revenues in total government revenues.  Robustness of results to using the share of 
subnational expenditures in total government expenditures as an alternative measure of 
fiscal decentralization was verified.  The data come from the IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics.  These measures are the most commonly used in the empirical literature on the 
effects of fiscal decentralization.  Although they are highly imperfect and do not reflect 
information on the distribution of decision-making authority between the levels of 
government, they provide a useful proxy for the relative level of countries’ fiscal 
decentralization.
12   
All measures of political centralization (described in the previous section) were 
taken from the Database on Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).  To check 
robustness of results we use the fractionalization of parliament (the probability that any 
two members of parliament picked at random belong to different parties) as an alternative 
measure of party strength. 
As measures of the quality of government we use an index of corruption by 
Transparency International and the World Bank indices of control over corruption, 
quality of governance, regulatory quality, and rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2002). To 
measure the quality of public goods provision we use data on the DPT immunization, 
infant mortality, illiteracy rate, and pupil-to-teacher ratio level from World Development 
                                                 
12 An important shortcoming of these data is that they do not distinguish between state and municipal 
expenditures and revenues; this breakdown is available only for a very limited number of countries.  The 
share of subnational expenditures is a better measure of fiscal decentralization “on average,” while the 
subnational revenue share is a better measure of  “marginal” fiscal decentralization because in many 
countries marginal retention rates do not change and are equal to the average share of revenues.  
  11Indicators by the World Bank.
13  To measure economic growth, changes in GDP per 
capita PPP are used. 
4.  Methodology 
We use standard methodology for growth regressions and regressions of the 
quality of government (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Barro, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; 
La Porta et al., 1999; and Treisman, 2000) and add explanatory variables that describe the 
level of fiscal decentralization, political institutions and - in our focus - their interaction 
term.   
Influence of political institutions on the results of fiscal decentralization, as well 
as the quality of our data, may differ for developing and transition countries, on the one 
hand, and developed countries, on the other hand.  Therefore, we split the sample into 
two subsamples: developed countries (the members of the Development Assistance 
Committee of OECD and Iceland) and developing and transition countries (all other 
countries).  Regression analysis is done separately for the two subsamples.
14
  To analyze the influence of political institutions on the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on indices of corruption and governance quality we use the following 
cross-section regression model: 
i i i i i i i е Control б Decentr Polit  б Decentr б Polit б б Y + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 *  (1) 
                                                 
13 Unlike the other measures of public goods, pupil-to-teacher ratio is not an outcome, but a characteristic 
of the process that might reflect inefficiencies of resource use rather than quality.  For many developing 
countries, however, number of teachers reflects a binding constraint.  We considered and rejected 
enrollment in schools as another possible measure of the quality of education.  It has a nonlinear 
relationship to the level of education in the country: for countries with high quality of education, it takes 
values around 100%, while for countries with lower level of education it takes values either lower or higher 
than 100%. The values are above 100% when adults go to school.   
14 Pooling the two subsamples together and allowing only the coefficients of interest to differ between the 
subsamples is rejected by econometric tests. 
  12where Yi is an index of corruption and governance quality for country   in year 2001.  
Polit
i
i and Decentri denote the variables that describe political institutions and fiscal 
decentralization in country i respectively (average for the period 1995-2000).  Controli is 
the set of control variables that includes logarithm of GDP per capita PPP in 1995, 
logarithm of population in 1995, share of Protestants, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
latitude, legal origin, democratic traditions by the year 1995, and current level of 
democracy (average for the period 1995-2000).  In these regressions, observations are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of indices of corruption and governance 
quality, which are provided along with the indices.   
To analyze the influence of political institutions on the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth and outcomes of public goods provision we take 
two approaches: 1) we study cross-country differences in economic growth and public 
goods with cross-section regressions and 2) short-run changes in public goods within 
countries with panel-data regressions.
15   
In cross-section specifications, we use the same regression model (1) in which Yi 
stands for the logarithm of change in GDP per capita PPP between 2000 and 1975 or 
average measure of public goods for years 1975-2000 in country i; Politi and Decentri 
denote the same variables as in (1) but averaged for the period 1975-2000; and Controli is 
the set of control variables.  Regressions with measures of public goods as dependent 
variables include the same control variables as in the regressions for indices of 
governance quality where averages taken for the period 1975-2000 and initial values 
taken in 1975 or the year closest to it.  In the regression for economic growth we add the 
                                                 
15 We were unable to use panel regressions for the analysis of economic growth due to the insufficient 
number of observations in five-year averaged regressions. 
  13level of fixed investments, openness of economy (measured as a share of exports and 
imports in GDP filtered for size of country and population), and logarithm of fertility as 
control variables.  All of these control variables were also measured in 1975 or the year 
closest to it.
16  In this set of cross-country regressions the weighting was done by the 
square root of the number of non-missing observations in the interaction term.  
For the subsample of the developing and transition countries in addition to OLS 
specification (1), we estimate 2SLS specification that uses the geographical area of 
countries as an instrument for fiscal decentralization.  We were not able to use the same 
instrument for the subsample of developed countries because of insufficiently strong 
correlation between the instrument and fiscal decentralization (see discussion in the 
section 5.2). 
The subsample of developing countries is rather small.  To allow for a sufficient 
number of degrees of freedom, as a baseline we report results from cross-section 
regressions for developed countries that exclude several most insignificant control 
variables.  As discussed in section 5.1, the results are robust to the choice of control 
variables. 
We also use panel regressions with fixed effects to estimate short-run changes in 
public goods provision:  
it t t it it it it it i it d Control Decentr Polit Decentr Polit Y ε ρ β β β β α + + + + + + = 4 3 2 1  (2) 
where Yit is a measure of an outcome of public goods provision in country   and year t.  
Polit
i
it and Decentrit denote variables that describe political institutions and fiscal 
                                                 
16 We did not include measures of human development or corruption as control variables in these 
regressions because, otherwise, possible channels of influence of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth would be blocked. 
  14decentralization in country i and year  ; d t t is a year dummy;  i α  is a country-specific 
fixed effect.  Controlit is the set of control variables that includes PPP GDP per capita for 
the previous year, logarithm of fertility, and current level of democracy.  To eliminate 
possible endogeneity we instrument democracy, political institutions, fiscal 
decentralization, and their interaction term with lagged values.   
In all regressions for developing and transition countries we exclude observations 
for socialist countries before the beginning of transition because economic institutions in 
these countries (i.e., central planning systems) seem to have different nature. 
5.  Results 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate our empirical results.  The figures present plots of the 
residual values from regressions of dependent variables on control variables either as a 
function of interaction term of decentralization and party strength (Figure 1) or as a 
function of decentralization separately for elected and appointed executives (Figure 2). 
Age of main parties 
Table 1 presents results for the age of main parties.  In the subsample of 
developing and transition countries it improves the effect of decentralization on all 
indices of government quality except for Transparency International index of corruption.  
A 10% increase in decentralization at a level of party age lower than the mean by one 
half of its standard deviation leads to a decrease in government quality indices of 
approximately one half of their standard deviations, while at a level of age of parties 
higher than the mean by the same amount the effect of decentralization is close to zero.  
At the mean age of parties, a 10% increase in decentralization leads to a decrease in 
indices by quarter of their standard deviations.  A threshold level of party age above 
  15which decentralization has a positive effect on indices of government quality is such that 
about 80% of the developing countries have parties younger than this level.  Party age 
also improves the effect of decentralization on immunization, infant mortality, and 
economic growth in the cross-section regressions.
17  From 70% to 90% of the developing 
countries have party age above a threshold that makes decentralization beneficial for 
public goods provision and economic growth.  Results of the panel regressions indicate 
that in developing countries the age of parties improves the short run effect of 
decentralization on immunization and pupil-to-teacher ratio also. 
In the subsample of developed countries, the age of main parties has the opposite 
effect to the one in developing countries.  We suggest an explanation for this in the 
section 6 below.  Older parties significantly hamper the effect of decentralization on all 
government quality indices (except for the regulatory quality which is insignificant).
18  
To this date 90% of the developed countries have party age sufficiently young for 
revenue decentralization not to have a negative effect on the quality of government. 
                                                 
17 A 10% increase in decentralization at the age of main parties lower than the mean by one half of its 
standard deviation leads to a decrease in immunization of 11 percentage points, an increase in infant 
mortality of 0.6 percentage points, and a decrease in 25 years’ economic growth of more than 30%.  The 
same size increase in decentralization at age of main parties higher than the mean by one half of its 
standard deviation leads to a decrease in immunization of five percentage points, a decrease in infant 
mortality of 0.2 percentage points, and a decrease in economic growth of 2%.  At the mean age of parties, a 
10% increase in decentralization decreases immunization by eight percentage points, increases infant 
mortality by 0.2 percentage points, and decreases long-term growth by 17%.  Additional ten years of age of 
the main parties at the mean level of decentralization lead to an increase in economic growth of 3% and 
immunization of one percentage point and a decrease in infant mortality of 0.2 percentage points. 
18 At a level of age of parties lower than the mean by one half of its standard deviation, a 10% increase in 
decentralization leads to an increase in the government quality indices of almost one half of their standard 
deviations. In contrast, at age of parties higher than the mean by one half of its standard deviation, a 10% 
increase in decentralization leads to a less than 20% of SDs increase in the indices on average.  At the 
mean level of party age, a 10% increase in decentralization leads to a 30% of SDs increase in the indices. 
  16In addition, cross-country regressions for developed countries show that party age 
hampers the effect of decentralization on infant mortality and economic growth.
19  A 
threshold level of party age above which decentralization has a negative effect on public 
goods and growth is such that more than 80% of the developed countries fall below the 
threshold.  The only significant result in panel regressions for developed countries is that 
party age hampers the effect of revenue decentralization on immunization level. 
Fractionalization of government parties 
Table 2 presents results for the fractionalization of government parties.  In the 
subsample of developing and transition countries, fractionalization of government parties 
significantly hampers the effect of decentralization on all indices of government quality 
(except for Transparency International index of corruption which is insignificant).
20  
Almost sixty percent of the developing countries in our sample have higher 
fractionalization than needed for decentralization to have a positive effect on the quality 
of government. 
Fractionalization also hampers the effect of decentralization on provision of all 
public goods considered and economic growth.
21  Almost half of the developing countries 
                                                 
19 A 10% increase in decentralization at age of parties lower than the mean by one half of its standard 
deviation decreases infant mortality by 0.1 percentage points and increases economic growth by 4%.  At 
age of parties higher than the mean by the same amount, it decreases infant mortality by 0.05 of a 
percentage point and increases economic growth by less than 1%. 
20 A 10% increase in decentralization, at a level of fractionalization lower than the mean by one half of its 
standard deviation, leads to an increase in government effectiveness of one third of its standard deviation 
and almost no change in other indices of government quality.  In contrast, at a level of fractionalization 
higher than the mean by one half of its standard deviation, a 10% increase in decentralization leads to no 
change in government effectiveness and a decrease in other indices of approximately one third of their 
standard deviations.  At the mean level of fractionalization, a 10% increase in decentralization increases the 
index of government effectiveness and decreases other indices of government quality by approximately 
15% of their standard deviations. 
21 A 10% increase in decentralization at a level of fractionalization lower than the mean by one half of its 
standard deviation leads to a 40% increase in 25 years’ economic growth, an increase in the level of 
immunization of one percentage point, a decrease in infant mortality of 0.6 percentage points, no change in 
illiteracy level, and a 10% decrease in pupil to teacher ratio.  In contrast, at a level of fractionalization 
  17have fractionalization above a threshold which makes the effect of decentralization on 
immunization, infant mortality, and illiteracy negative, while for the pupil to teacher ratio 
and economic growth this share is only 10%.  Panel regressions for developing countries 
do not contain any significant results. 
Cross-section results for developed countries are unrobust to the choice of control 
variables and are subject to alternative explanations (see section 5.1 below).  Panel results 
for developed countries indicate that increased fractionalization hampers the short run 
effect of decentralization on infant mortality and pupil to teacher ratio. 
State executives appointed/elected 
Table 3 presents results for the effect of elections of state executives.  The effect 
of decentralization on the indices of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and 
rule of law in developing and transition countries is negative and insignificant in the case 
of elected state executives and positive insignificant in the case of appointed executives 
with a significant difference between them. About 40% of the developing countries have 
decentralization below a threshold which makes the quality of government higher in the 
case of elected state executives.
22   
Cross-country regressions show that the effect of decentralization on infant 
mortality, illiteracy, and economic growth is negative and insignificant in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
higher than the mean by one half of its standard deviation, it leads to a 20% increase in economic growth, a 
decrease in the level of immunization of three percentage points, a decrease in infant mortality of 0.1 
percentage points, a decrease in illiteracy of two percentage points, and a 5% decrease in pupil to teacher 
ratio.  At the mean level of fractionalization, an increase in decentralization by 10% decreases 
immunization and increases illiteracy by two and one percentage points, respectively, but also decreases 
infant mortality by 0.3 percentage points and pupil to teacher ratio by 9%, while economic growth 
increases by 30%. 
22 A 10% increase in decentralization in the case of elected state executives decreases these indices by 
approximately one half of their standard deviations.  A comparison of the quality of government for elected 
and appointed state executives at the mean value of decentralization shows that in the case of elected 
executives the indices are lower by more than one half of their standard deviations. 
  18elected state executives and positive insignificant in the case of appointed executives with 
a significant difference between them.  More than one half of the developing countries 
have decentralization below a threshold which makes the public goods provision and 
economic growth higher in the case of elected state executives.
23  As discussed in the 
section 5.1 below, all panel results for the administrative subordination measures turn out 
to be unrobust because of insufficient over-time variation. 
In the developed countries, elections of state executives do not significantly affect 
decentralization outcomes in the quality of government.  The effect of decentralization on 
economic growth and alleviation of infant mortality, in the case of appointed state 
executives, is significantly positive and, in the case of elected executives, - insignificant 
and close to zero, with a statistically significant difference in slopes.
24  A threshold level 
below which infant mortality is better in the case of elected state executives is such that 
about one half of the developed countries are below the threshold.  For growth this 
proportion is more than 80%. 
Municipal executives appointed/elected 
Results for subordination of municipal executives are presented in Table 4.  The 
only significant results for the subsample of developing and transition countries are that 
local elections worsen the effect of decentralization on regulation quality, economic 
growth and immunization.  The effect is positive and insignificant for appointed 
                                                 
23 A 10% increase in revenue decentralization in the case of elected state executives decreases infant 
mortality by one percentage point and economic growth by 75%.  The effect for expenditure 
decentralization is twice as low.  At the mean level of expenditure decentralization in the case of elected 
state executives infant mortality is higher by 0.6 percentage points and economic growth is higher by 15%. 
At the mean level of revenue decentralization in the case of elected state executives infant mortality is 
higher by 0.1 percentage points and economic growth is lower by 6%. 
24 In the case of appointed state executives, a 10% increase in subnational revenue share leads to a decrease 
in infant mortality of 0.2 percentage points and 10% increase in growth.  Overall, countries with elected 
state executives have better outcomes due to sufficiently low mean decentralization: infant mortality is 0.7 
percentage points lower and growth rate is 13% higher at the mean level of decentralization. 
  19municipal executives and negative and insignificant for the elected local executives with 
a significant difference in slopes.
25  A threshold level above which immunization and 
growth is higher in countries with elected (compared to appointed) municipal executives 
is such that more than one half of the developing countries fall below the threshold.  For 
the regulation quality around 80% of the countries are below the threshold. 
The only statistically significant result for developed countries about government 
quality is for the government effectiveness index.  In the case of elected municipal 
executives, the effect of decentralization on government effectiveness is very small, 
positive, and insignificant. In the case of appointed executives, it is negative, much larger 
in absolute value and also insignificant.  The difference between slopes of these effects is 
statistically significant.  Government effectiveness is better in countries with elected 
municipal executives when revenue decentralization is above 26%, leaving more than one 
half of the developed countries below the threshold level.
26  The cross-section results 
about public goods provision are the opposite: local elections worsen the decentralization 
outcomes.  The effect of decentralization on immunization, infant mortality, and pupil to 
teacher ratio in cross-section of developed countries is positive for appointed and elected 
executives, but the difference in slopes is significant.  The threshold level of 
decentralization above which the outcomes for infant mortality and pupil to teacher ratio 
are worse in the case of elected municipal executives is such that more than one half of 
                                                 
25 With elected municipal executives, a 10% increase in decentralization leads to a decrease in regulation 
quality of 15% of standard deviation, 14% drop in immunization level and a 40% fall in growth.  At the 
mean level of decentralization, regulation quality if higher by 75% of standard deviation, immunization 
level is 8% lower and economic growth is 15% higher in the cash of elected municipal executives.  
26 The overall effect of municipal elections on the government effectiveness at the mean of decentralization 
is negative: the index is more than one half of its standard deviation lower in the case of elected municipal 
executives.  
  20the developed countries fall below the threshold.  For immunization almost all the 
developed countries are above the threshold. 
The next two sections (5.1 and 5.2) discuss robustness of our results with regard 
to alternative explanations, influential observations, choice of specifications, 
measurement error, sample selection, and endogeneity.  Readers not interested in 
methodological technicalities can directly skip to section 6 that discusses the results. 
5.1. Sensitivity analysis  
To check sensitivity of the results with respect to influential observations in cross-
country regressions, we estimated the same model using robust regressions and excluding 
China - the most influential observation in cross-section regressions.  The results of the 
robust regressions in most cases are the same as of the baseline regressions. Several 
results become insignificant while preserving the sign of coefficients. Few results - 
insignificant in the baseline setting - become significant.  All of these results are in line 
with the pattern of the baseline estimation.  The effect of excluding China is similar.   
The results of panel regressions were also tested for presence of influential 
observations.  By and large, in regressions for the measures of party strength exclusion of 
any single country does not lead to significant changes in the magnitude of estimated 
coefficients and leaves them inside the initial confidence intervals.  In cases when 
exclusion of one country made coefficients insignificant, the loss of significance can be 
attributed to reduced number of observations and not to the presence of influential 
observations.   
There is a dichotomy between results for public goods provision in cross-section 
and panel regressions for the measures of subordination of subnational authorities.  It is 
  21particularly striking for elections of state executives: all panel results suggest that 
elections lead to better outcomes of decentralization; cross-section results state the 
opposite.  As it turns out, panel results for subordination are unrobust, have poor 
explanatory power, and are subject to reverse causality.  First, most of the results about 
the effect of decentralization on public goods provision in panel regressions (that indicate 
better effect of decentralization in case of elected executives) change sign after the 
exclusion of Sweden for developed countries and Iran, Argentina, or Israel for developing 
countries.  Second, between 97 and 99.99 percent of total explained variation in 
dependent variables is accounted for by country fixed effects, in other words, is 
essentially left unexplained in the panel regressions for subordination.  Yet about 60 to 80 
percent of variation in point estimates of country fixed effects is explained by the right 
hand side variables from cross-country regressions and the contribution of the cross-term 
of political centralization and fiscal decentralization is in range between 1 and 9 
percentage points.  Note that in panel regressions for party strength, about 12 percent of 
explained variation is due to changes in explanatory variables rather than fixed effects 
and results of cross-section and panel regressions for party strength are consistent.   
Finally, panel results for subordination may be driven by reverse causation as very small 
(compared to overall variation) short run changes in dependent variable can influence the 
explanatory variables.  This situation can occur if national government provides more 
financial assistance to the regions that have temporary troubles with public goods 
provision in the case of appointed local executives and less assistance in the case when 
they are elected.  This story produces negative correlation between the short run changes 
in fiscal decentralization and public goods in the case of appointed local executives and 
  22no significant correlation in the case of elected executives just as panel results suggest.  
All the pieces of evidence indicate that we should put emphasis on the cross-section 
results for subordination.
27
The results proved to be robust to the addition of the following control variables: 
initial GDP per capita squared, federation dummy (Treisman, 2000), regional dummies 
(Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union, Asia, Africa, Middle East, Latin 
America), colonial dummies (British, Spanish, French, and other colonies), average size 
of jurisdictions in cross-section regressions, logarithm of population in panel regressions 
and interaction term of population and measures of fiscal decentralization in both cross-
country and panel regressions.  In addition, results are robust to replacing the across-time 
average level of democracy by its initial level in cross-country regressions. After 
exclusion of countries with authoritarian regimes from the sample some results lost 
significance while most remain significant and consistent with the baseline results. 
To check whether the strength of the party system provides political incentives 
even in case of appointed executives, we ran the same regressions for the subsample of 
developing and transition countries with appointed state executives (other possible 
subsamples did not contain sufficient number of observations).  Cross-section results in 
regressions without instruments for government effectiveness, control over corruption, 
rule of law, immunization, and infant mortality remain significant.  All other results 
become insignificant, while preserving the sign. In the regressions with instruments all 
                                                 
27 If, despite of all said, one takes panel results seriously, the difference between the panel and cross-section 
results can arise because of a bias in cross-section estimation as a result of unobserved heterogeneity.  If 
this is the case, the true results are produced by the panel regressions.  It is, however, hard to believe that 
local elections provide weaker political incentives in developed countries compared to developing: panel 
results suggest that decentralization brings inferior outcomes of immunization and infant mortality when 
subnational officials are elected in the developed countries and superior outcomes in developing countries. 
  23the results become insignificant.  But since the bias in uninstrumented regressions 
attenuates coefficients towards zero (see section 5.2), the loss of significance can be 
attributed to insufficient number of observations. 
In the beginning of transition, many post-communist countries experienced 
“initial” output fall, deterioration in quality of public goods, and economic 
decentralization (Roland, 2000). Since we cannot account for the nature of these 
processes, we verified that the exclusion of observations for the transition countries 
before 1995 does not affect the results. 
To make sure that results of panel regressions do not just reflect global trends in 
decentralization and its effectiveness for instance, due to better information and 
monitoring technologies (De Figueiredo and Weingast, 2002), in addition to year 
dummies, we included interaction term of year dummies and decentralization to control 
for these trends and got the same results as in the baseline regressions. 
The age of parties may reflect the country age or the age of democracy. In this 
case institution-building processes that may affect decentralization outcomes could drive 
our results based on party age.  In order to rule this story out, we included direct 
measures of the country age since independence and the age of democracy together with 
their interaction terms with fiscal decentralization for all regressions with the party age in 
the subsample of developing countries.
28  The results proved to be robust. 
A potential drawback of fractionalization of government parties as a measure of 
party strength is that it may reflect the effects of other political institutions that affect 
                                                 
28 As a proxy for the age of democracy we take the number of years since the democratic regime has been 
established for the last time as reported in Polity IV data base.  The age of democracy takes zero value if the 
current or any future value of Polity IV measure of democracy is zero.  This measure of the age of 
democracy is only weakly correlated with the age of main parties. 
  24both the fractionalization and the results of decentralization.  Literature on comparative 
politics stresses the systematic differences between party structures – fractionalization, in 
particular – in presidential and parliamentary systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992) and 
majoritarian and proportional electoral rules (see Duverger, 1972  and Myerson, 1999); 
these differences likely but not necessarily reflect party strength (Duverger, 1972).   
Moreover, electoral rules and government systems may directly affect corruption 
(Myerson, 1999; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003) and public goods provision 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 2000).  To make sure that 
fractionalization of governing parties measures the party strength rather than the effect of 
these other institutions we tried each of the following three options.  First, we included 
dummies for electoral rule and government system as well as their interaction term with 
the measures of fiscal decentralization in the set of control variables.  Second, we used 
the residuals from the regression of government parties’ fractionalization on these 
dummy variables as an alternative measure of party strength.  Third, for developing 
countries we had sufficient number of observations to re-estimate regressions on the 
subsample of countries with proportional representation.  Each approach produced results 
very similar to the baseline. 
Another potential drawback of fractionalization of government parties as a 
measure of party strength is that high fractionalization may reflect high geographical 
segregation of voters with different political preferences.  In this case fractionalization of 
government parties may capture the existence of secessionist tendencies that can lead to 
inefficient fiscal decentralization aimed at appeasing secessionist tendencies.  To rule this 
explanation out, we, first, control for a dummy variable that tells whether a country has 
  25autonomous or self-governing regions and its interaction term with measures of fiscal 
decentralization (the Database on Political Institutions, Version 3, Beck et al., 2001).  
Our results proved to be robust.  Second, we construct a measure of heterogeneity of 
voting patterns on national elections across regions and control for it along with its 
interaction with fiscal decentralization.
29  The results for developing countries again 
proved to be robust; while the results for the subsample of developed countries turn out to 
be unrobust.  After controlling for voting heterogeneity, in developed countries, 
government fractionalization impairs the effect of decentralization on public goods 
provision, but improves its effect on government quality. 
The number of developed countries is small.  Thus, the number of degrees of 
freedom in cross-country regressions for developed countries may be insufficient if we 
include the full set of controls used in the regressions for the subsample of developing 
countries.  We use the following two alternative strategies to check robustness of the 
results for developed countries with respect to the choice of control variables: 1) one-by-
one exclusion of the least statistically significant control variables (with t-statistics less 
than unity) from regressions with the full set of controls and 2) one-by-one inclusion of 
the most economically and statistically significant control variables to the regressions 
starting with no controls.   Regardless of the strategy, we get the same results as in 
                                                 
29 The data on regional voting patterns on national elections come from counties’ official electoral 
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  26regressions with the full set of controls with the only difference that exclusion of 
insignificant control variables in some cases makes the results more significant.
30
Overall, sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are generally stable with the 
exception of cross-section results based on government fractionalization measure in 
developed countries and panel results for administrative subordination.  All results from 
panel and cross-section specifications that proved to be robust are consistent with each 
other. 
5.2. Endogeneity issues 
The most important source of endogeneity is that the quality of government, 
economic growth and public goods provision may affect popularity of existing parties 
and the strength of country’s party system. Unfortunately, we do not have valid 
instruments for political institutions in cross-section regressions.  To account for possible 
endogeneity we used the initial levels of the age of main parties and government 
fractionalization instead of across-time averages in the cross-section analysis.  The results 
using initial values of political institutions are very similar to those in the baseline 
regressions (few results lost significance, however).  Still, the initial levels are not a very 
good instrument; and possible endogeneity of the strength of political parties is the main 
concern for our cross-section results.  
Since fiscal decentralization may also be endogenous (Strumpf and Oberholzer-
Gee, 2002 and Fisman and Gatti, 2002), in cross-country regressions we use geographical 
area of countries and its interaction term with measures of political centralization as 
                                                 
30 All the results (from the estimation with the full set of controls) preserve their sign and most remain 
significant with no control variables included into regressions (except for growth regressions where the 
initial GDP per capita is an important control).  All the results become significant after adding two most 
significant control variables. 
  27instruments for fiscal decentralization and the interaction of decentralization and political 
institutions.
31  The intuition behind this instrument is that, ceteris paribus, costs of 
centralized governance increase with geographical size of the country which leads to 
higher economic decentralization in countries with larger area.  In the subsample of 
developing and transition countries geographical area is strongly correlated with fiscal 
decentralization.  In the subsample of developed countries, however, the correlation is 
weaker.  As shown in Table A5 in appendix (which reports F-statistics from all the first 
stage regressions), residual correlation of our instrument with decentralization in OECD 
countries is prohibitively weak in regressions for measures of party strength.  Thus, we 
report uninstrumented results for the subsample of developed countries.  For geographical 
area to be a valid instrument, it should be uncorrelated with the independent variables 
other than through its effect on fiscal decentralization.  Yet, in the long run, geographical 
area can be endogenous (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina 2003).  We assume that 25 
years is sufficiently short horizon to treat the area of countries as exogenous.
32 
Comparison of the results with and without instruments for decentralization shows that 
the signs of coefficients are the same and the magnitudes increase considerably (by one 
and a half - two times on average).  Some of the results that are insignificant in 
regressions without instruments become significant with instrumentation.  The Hausman 
                                                 
31 Other studies (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; de Mello and Barenstein, 2001) used country legal origin as an 
instrument. It is not an appropriate choice of instrument in our case because legal origin can affect our 
dependent variables not through fiscal decentralization but through other channels (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Our results support this notion because legal origin is significant in regressions that include measures of 
fiscal decentralization. 
32 This assumption is supported by the fact that geographical area is insignificant if added in regressions 
that include fiscal decentralization.  We should note, however, that almost all the countries in our sample 
for which the area changed since 1975 emerged after the brake up of the former socialist states (Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia).  Although their resultant size was historically predetermined, 
there is a possibility that the brake up and performance of these countries during transition are related in a 
way that introduces correlation between the geographical area and our dependent variables. 
  28test, however, does not reject the hypothesis that both specifications are consistent with 
the exception of one regression for GDP growth and party age where the null hypothesis 
is rejected.  In the regressions for the subsample of developed countries that use 
subordination as a measure of political centralization, the results of regressions with and 
without instruments are almost identical.  (F-statistics are sufficiently high to make this 
comparison.)  Therefore, we conclude that 1) in developing countries there may be a bias 
that attenuates coefficients towards zero, probably, as a result of a measurement error and 
2) results for developed countries are unbiased. 
Lags are used as instruments in panel regressions for fiscal decentralization, 
political centralization, their interaction term, and democracy.  For the most part, 
instrumentation increases the magnitude of coefficients while preserving their signs.  This 
is also consistent with the measurement error explanation of the bias.  The only exception 
is regressions with government fractionalization as a measure of party strength.  Use of 
instruments in these regressions leads to a negative shift in point estimates of coefficients 
(we observe occasional alteration of the sign when coefficients are positive in 
uninstrumented regressions).  A possible explanation of this bias is as follows.  An 
increase in economic performance can have different effect on fractionalization of 
governing parties in economically centralized and decentralized states.  In countries with 
low level of decentralization, better performance leads to relative strengthening of the 
national governing parties because the success is attributed to national policies.  In highly 
decentralized countries, voters attribute economic success to regional policies that may 
lead to a relative increase in fractionalization of national government parties due to 
strengthening of local political organizations.  Then, uninstrumented regressions should 
  29produce an upward bias in the coefficient of the interaction term between government 
fractionalization and fiscal decentralization.  This is consistent with our findings. 
6.  Summary and discussion of empirical results 
First we discuss the results about strength of political parties.
33  We find very 
strong evidence that in developing countries low age of main parties and high 
fractionalization of government parties worsen the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth, government quality, and public goods.
34  This evidence is a solid 
support for Riker’s theory that strong political parties increase political accountability of 
subnational governments improving the results of decentralization.  In contrast, in 
developed countries party age has a negative effect on decentralization results, while 
effect of government fractionalization is unrobust.  The difference in results for party age 
in two subsamples highlights the importance of the level of civic development and 
democratic tradition for functioning of political institutions.
35  Generally speaking, 
political centralization has two effects on political incentives:  a beneficial effect of 
strengthening career concerns and a possible adverse effect of decreased political 
competition.  In the two groups of countries the age of main parties captures different 
aspects of political centralization.  Developed countries are characterized by presence of 
a priori strong political incentives compared to developing countries.  At this level of 
development, an increase in party age primarily reflects a relative decrease in political 
competition because it is a sign of insufficient political turnover.  In this case, career 
                                                 
33 Table A6 in appendix summarizes all results: it presents signs and significance of coefficients at cross-
terms of fiscal decentralization and political institutions. 
34 The fact that political institutions affect results of decentralization in the same way for all the outcomes is 
remarkable because in many contexts there exist a tradeoff between growth and government quality, on the 
one hand, and public goods provision, on the other hand (Besley and Coate, 2003; Roland 2000). 
35 Note that this difference can not be explained by presence of nonlinear effect because the ranges of 
values of the party age variable in developed and developing countries significantly overlap. 
  30concerns effect is also present, but is dominated.
36  Under the conditions of low level of 
civic capital and absence of long democratic tradition, party strength turns out to have a 
much smaller effect on political competition compared to developed countries because 
even very weak parties can eliminate political competition by capturing electoral 
institutions and media.  Russia in the 1990s provides a good example of how local and 
regional-level politicians can manage to eliminate political competition altogether with 
the help of control over local media and courts.  We test validity of this explanation for 
the difference in party age results in developed and developing countries by re-estimating 
party age regressions separately for subsamples of developing countries with high and 
low level of media independence.  The results of the text are consistent with our 
explanation.
37    Thus, an increase in party age in developed countries has an adverse 
effect on political incentives because the marginal cost of a decrease in political 
competition overweighs the marginal benefit of an increase in career concerns.  In 
contrast, in developing countries political competition plays little role in disciplining 
politicians and career concerns become the source of local political incentives.  Overall, 
Riker’s theory is confirmed by the evidence from developing countries. 
                                                 
36 Government fractionalization captures both career concerns and political competition effects because it 
reflects political weight of an average governing party.  Note that fractionalization may reflect both an 
increase and a decrease in political competition. The latter could happen when the largest governing party 
retains the same-size fraction in parliament and the other parties get more fractionalized. 
37 In the subsample of developing countries with freedom of press below the median (measured by the 
Freedom House index, www.freedomhouse.com), we find some evidence in line with the overall results for 
developing countries: higher party age improves the effect of decentralization for TI index of corruption 
and immunization level.  In contrast, the evidence from the subsample of developing countries with press 
freedom above the median resembles the results for developed countries: party age worsens the effect of 
decentralization on TI corruption index, regulatory quality, and pupil to teacher ratio.  The results of this 
test at best should be viewed as weak tentative evidence in favor of our explanation because the number of 
degrees of freedom in these regressions is very small.  Press freedom index included directly or as 
interaction in the regressions is insignificant, which may be explained by the unreliable cardinal properties 
of the index. 
  31Let us turn to the discussion of results about the effect of subnational elections.  
The cross-section results for developing countries sharply contrast with the view that 
local elections provide sufficient political accountability.  Elections of state executive 
officials worsen the effect of decentralization on quality of government, public goods 
provision, and economic growth in developing countries.  Municipal elections also 
significantly hurt decentralization results for economic growth and provision of some 
public goods.  The net effect of elections, however, is positive for almost one half of the 
developing countries that have sufficiently low decentralization.
38  Subnational elections 
do not result in better decentralization outcomes in developing countries because of 
localism, relatively high capture, and provincial protectionism (Bardhan, 2002). 
The results for developed countries are mixed.  There is evidence of a negative 
effect of subnational elections on the decentralization outcomes for growth, 
immunization, and infant mortality.  Yet, there is a small positive effect of 
decentralization on quality of governance: municipal elections significantly improve the 
results of revenue decentralization for government effectiveness (in all other regressions, 
cross-terms of government quality indices with municipal elections have positive 
insignificant coefficients).  Overall, we find that elections have a better effect on 
accountability in developed compared to developing and transition countries.
39
                                                 
38 Local elections have independent of decentralization effect on governance. First, they help the 
government to gather and aggregate information about people’s preferences.  Second, they have an 
important influence on development of civil society. 
39 Besley and Coate (2003) compare performance of elected to appointed regulators in the US electricity 
sector and find that elected regulators ensure lower consumer prices but not necessarily better quality of 
service. 
  327.  Conclusions 
Our key finding is that political institutions - in particular, political centralization 
- play an important role in determining the results of fiscal decentralization.  In line with 
the theory of Riker (1964) we find that strong national party system is a very effective 
way of securing political accountability needed for efficient decentralization in 
developing countries.  There is no straightforward relationship between party strength 
and results of decentralization in developed countries; political centralization has two 
effects that work in opposite directions: weakening of political competition and 
strengthening of career concerns. 
Constitutional and administrative arrangements that make local executives 
directly subordinate to the higher-level authorities also were found to improve political 
incentives in decentralization (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000).  This, however, does not 
mean that a policy prescription for a large inherently decentralized country should be to 
get rid of subnational elections.  First, local elections have a substantial (independent of 
decentralization) positive effect on many economic outcomes.  Second, they are a 
necessary prerequisite to developing democratic tradition, civil society, and other 
components of civic capital accumulation.  Third, politicians at all levels of government 
may be subject to capture, and therefore, administrative control of local by central 
officials does not necessarily align interest of local bureaucrats with the public (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 1999). 
Thus, a better remedy to poor governance in inherently decentralized countries is 
building strong national political parties.  Strong parties help to provide elected local 
officials with efficient political incentives because their chances of reelection depend 
  33both on the national party support (i.e., national objectives) and the satisfaction of local 
constituency (i.e., local accountability). 
Fiscal decentralization and political institutions affect one another and are 
influenced by many other factors.  Accounting for the determinants of fiscal 
decentralization and political institutions is the task for future research. 
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Subnational revenue share -0.025 -0.058 -0.057 -0.070 -1.429 -0.919 -0.010 -0.049 -1.294 0.053 -0.012 0.091 0.036 0.029 0.041 0.024 0.116 0.265 0.010 1.092 0.130
[1.22] [1.54] [1.74]* [2.29]** [1.26] [1.10] [0.55] [1.06] [2.10]** [0.20] [1.79]* [2.97]** [2.51]** [2.16]* [2.74]** [3.03]** [0.20] [3.18]*** [1.65] [1.07] [2.33]**
CROSSTERM: Subnational 
revenue share &
Age of the main parties 0.892 1.658 1.670 1.880 28.256 31.737 0.370 1.356 50.463 -4.860 0.457 -0.882 -0.251 -0.195 -0.350 -0.185 -0.411 -2.571 -0.119 -22.576 -0.739
[1.89]* [1.81]* [2.18]** [2.54]** [1.87]* [2.78]*** [1.67] [3.61]*** [3.01]*** [0.92] [2.71]*** [3.70]*** [2.04]* [1.70] [3.13]** [2.38]** [0.09] [3.61]*** [2.25]** [2.48]** [1.29]
Age of the main parties -5.118 -28.914 -30.460 -31.498 -339.95 -314.04 -4.69 -16.74 -647.00 -137.60 -8.48 44.157 14.090 12.648 19.262 9.151 -73.79 43.72 6.97 891.09 21.09
[0.38] [1.31] [1.67] [1.69] [1.34] [1.73]* [1.34] [2.69]*** [1.85]* [1.50] [2.84]*** [3.88]*** [2.56]** [2.51]** [3.54]*** [2.14]* [0.43] [1.41] [3.31]*** [3.17]*** [1.12]
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 0.479 0.201 0.415 0.338 1.934 22.726 0.169 -0.530 28.116 9.370 0.255 -5.507 -1.147 -1.800 -2.548 -0.558 -3.513 -0.305 -0.901 28.986 3.204
[4.33]*** [1.45] [2.93]*** [2.63]** [0.55] [7.63]*** [3.77]*** [3.67]*** [3.42]*** [2.45]** [3.36]*** [2.76]** [1.08] [1.53] [2.52]** [0.89] [0.52] [0.24] [11.76]*** [1.62] [3.13]***
Democratic traditions 0.055 0.011 0.138 0.097 1.504 3.737 0.014 0.050 0.584 0.111 0.156 0.208 0.100
[2.29]** [0.27] [4.43]*** [2.76]** [1.12] [2.17]** [0.57] [0.99] [2.89]** [1.01] [1.23] [2.00]* [1.52]
Current level of democracy 0.039 0.063 0.024 0.062 -0.138 -0.203 0.018 0.035 -1.160 -0.402 -0.008 -6.021 -1.823 -0.250 -5.681 -0.436
[1.91]* [1.64] [1.02] [2.52]** [0.14] [0.16] [0.88] [0.98] [1.64] [0.88] [1.44] [1.05] [1.28] [2.53]** [0.69] [0.80]
Logarithm (Fertility) -0.653 -83.564 -28.455 -0.204 -9.408 -3.536
[1.63] [5.23]*** [3.59]*** [1.34] [1.01] [5.39]***
Logarithm (Population) -0.008 -0.009 0.004 0.046 0.078 -0.050 -0.011 0.142 -0.378 -0.078 -0.085 -0.132 -0.093 -0.351 0.070 0.031
[0.12] [0.10] [0.05] [0.56] [0.02] [0.01] [0.21] [0.80] [4.18]*** [1.81] [2.01]* [3.40]*** [3.55]*** [0.19] [0.37] [0.90]
Share of protestant 0.006 0.009 0.001 -0.009 -0.257 -0.254 -0.006 -0.006 0.024 -0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.233 0.029 0.000
[0.76] [0.70] [0.13] [0.81] [1.30] [1.36] [1.94]* [0.88] [4.01]*** [0.79] [0.40] [2.37]** [0.07] [1.80]* [2.05]* [0.22]
0.386 0.282 0.733 1.359 2.842 -12.362 0.223 0.013 46.156 5.118 -0.285
[0.61] [0.25] [0.94] [1.45] [0.16] [0.81] [0.70] [0.02] [2.07]* [1.97]* [1.56]
Latitude 0.337 0.761 1.900 2.760 68.007 4.866 0.774 3.364 -4.740 0.501 -0.449 -1.369 -0.233 3.461 10.557 -0.353
[0.23] [0.29] [0.84] [1.34] [1.02] [0.12] [0.83] [1.24] [2.16]* [0.70] [0.66] [1.39] [0.47] [0.12] [3.03]** [1.14]
English legal origin . . . . -4.626 -48.053 0.174 -0.746 -15.993 0.801 -0.074
[.] [.] [.] [.] [0.42] [5.44]*** [1.37] [2.93]*** [1.02] [0.58] [0.71]
Socialist Legal origin 0.176 -0.419 0.231 0.092 8.694 -19.111 0.375 -2.119
[0.46] [0.89] [0.42] [0.22] [1.02] [2.40]** [3.18]*** [6.47]***
French legal origin 0.037 0.327 0.386 0.297 -0.003 -34.646 0.134 -0.337 1.83 0.44 0.49 0.85 0.13 -3.657 1.112 -0.043





Annual dummies YYY YY
Observations 39 39 39 39 70 70 70 70 329 219 241 20 20 20 20 20 22 22 22 207 366
Number of countries 48 51 45 21 22
R-squared 0.86 0.63 0.48 0.82 0.83 0.71 0.83 0.96
Panel B. Subsample of developed countries
Quality of Government 
(Cross-section)±
Public Goods and Growth  Public Goods (Panel)± Quality of Government
  (Cross-section)
Public Goods and Growth
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 




Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses in cross-section regressions, and of z-statistics - in panel regressions. *** - significant at 1% 
level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level.  In cross-country regressions for developed countries, the number of control variables is decreased 
to provide additional degrees of freedom (see section 5.1). 
± In developing countries, there are no significant results for Transparency International index of corruption and illiteracy;  In developed countries, there are no 
significant results in regressions of pupil-to-teacher ratio and illiteracy. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Subnational revenue share 0.038 0.029 0.011 0.008 0.012 0.333 0.699 0.127 0.011 0.055 0.042 -0.010 0.010 0.005 -1.037 0.068 -0.003
[1.37] [2.51]** [0.85] [0.64] [1.40] [0.97] [1.32] [0.29] [1.66] [1.53] [0.16] [0.21] [1.13] [0.90] [2.23]** [2.11]** [0.15]
-0.092 -0.074 -0.072 -0.074 -0.089 -1.789 -2.068 -0.908 -0.026 -0.086 -1.006 -0.057 -0.031 -0.006 -0.961 0.041 -0.065
[1.26] [3.20]*** [3.03]*** [2.75]** [5.46]*** [6.94]*** [3.74]*** [2.04]** [3.26]*** [3.92]*** [2.26]** [0.58] [1.66] [0.54] [1.41] [0.70] [2.71]***
2.268 1.283 1.126 1.558 1.493 19.521 46.626 13.271 0.557 1.456 8.077 4.774 0.420 0.367 15.948 -0.508 0.938
[1.11] [2.08]** [1.53] [2.35]** [3.06]*** [2.41]** [3.18]*** [1.11] [3.43]*** [2.82]*** [0.73] [1.17] [0.63] [0.88] [1.01] [0.37] [1.52]
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 1.197 0.511 0.212 0.369 0.359 2.759 19.598 13.988 0.148 -0.381 -3.583 0.663 -0.181 -0.936 49.022 3.448 -1.063
[2.69]** [3.38]*** [1.28] [2.41]** [2.85]*** [1.26] [5.24]*** [4.23]*** [3.25]*** [1.84]* [0.75] [0.65] [0.75] [8.07]*** [2.89]*** [3.66]*** [2.08]**
Democratic traditions 0.164 0.053 -0.004 0.119 0.074 1.035 4.767 1.714 0.018 0.034
[1.86]* [1.81]* [0.09] [2.64]** [2.70]** [1.02] [3.00]*** [1.28] [0.88] [0.77]
Current level of democracy -0.048 0.034 0.063 0.021 0.066 0.243 -0.869 0.078 0.016 -0.028 -9.386 -1.561 0.119 -0.081 3.079 -0.210 0.002
[0.76] [1.11] [1.47] [0.82] [2.44]** [0.34] [0.75] [0.08] [0.97] [0.55] [1.53] [1.37] [0.59] [0.62] [0.41] [0.47] [0.01]
Logarithm (Population) -0.175 -0.050 -0.036 -0.002 0.012 -1.877 -0.936 1.462 -0.023 -0.064
[1.03] [0.65] [0.40] [0.03] [0.18] [1.00] [0.29] [0.56] [0.53] [0.37]
Share of protestant 0.027 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.001 -0.105 -0.077 0.153 -0.003 0.003 0.219 0.023 0.0015 -0.0001
[2.02]* [1.61] [1.84]* [1.77]* [0.10] [0.87] [0.39] [0.55] [1.10] [0.53] [2.66]** [2.20]* [0.48] [0.06]
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  -1.087 0.032 -0.335 -0.069 0.582 -14.40 -36.46 -5.516 -0.101 -1.217 51.468 3.499 0.299 -0.143
[0.81] [0.05] [0.43] [0.18] [1.07] [2.21]** [2.97]*** [0.55] [0.47] [1.77]* [2.92]** [0.99] [0.51] [0.46]
Latitude -0.020 -1.032 -1.599 0.051 -0.019 15.967 -39.3 -14.3 -0.002 -1.162 -15.177 5.611 -0.908 -0.306
[0.01] [0.94] [1.14] [0.04] [0.02] [0.86] [0.97] [0.68] [0.00] [0.57] [0.93] [1.08] [1.78] [0.68]
English legal origin . -0.432 -0.248 -0.715 -0.812 -1.793 -49.27 -28.44 0.154 -0.514 -32.907 -0.374 -0.827 -0.012
[.] [1.28] [0.68] [1.93]* [3.18]*** [0.26] [5.16]*** [3.51]*** [1.26] [1.69]* [2.95]** [0.20] [2.00]* [0.08]
Socialist Legal origin - 0 . 5 2 7 .... 1 3 . 5 0 8 - 8 . 8 6 4 - 3 . 8 7 0 0 . 4 8 2 - 2 . 1 0 7
[0.51] [.] [.] [.] [.] [2.71]*** [1.12] [0.50] [4.13]*** [6.28]***
French legal origin -0.135 -0.195 0.082 -0.223 -0.485 -3.477 -31.427 -18.783 0.099 -0.676 -18.776 -2.140 -0.562 -0.143





Logarithm (Fertility) -1.355 -16.275 -3.584 -0.921
[3.82]*** [1.66]* [5.58]*** [4.24]***
Annual dummies YYY
Observations 34 39 39 39 39 73 73 67 73 73 22 22 21 22 210 380 165
Number of countries 21 22 20
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.52 0.91
Panel A. Cross-country regressions, subsample of developing and transition countries Panel B. Subsample of developed countries




Public Goods and Growth± Government Quality
Fractionalization of government parties
CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & 
Fractionalization of government parties
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses in cross-section regressions,  z-statistics - in panel regressions. *** - significant at 1% level;** - 
significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level.   In cross-country regressions for developed countries, the number of control variables is decreased to 
provide additional degrees of freedom (section 5.1). 
± In developing countries, panel regressions do not yield any significant results; in developed countries, there are no significant results in cross section 
regressions for measures of the quality of government. 






































































































































































































































































































































































Subnational revenue share 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.012 0.0296 0.418 1.858 0.875 0.016 0.058 0.359 0.166 0.016 0.013
(Effect for appointed state executives) [1.10] [1.50] [1.26] [0.46] [0.94] [0.54] [1.46] [1.03] [1.14] [0.94] [1.49] [3.87]*** [1.35] [3.50]***
CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share & -0.062 -0.078 -0.095 -0.047 -0.068 -1.578 -3.074 -1.798 -0.024 -0.134 0.185 -0.156 -0.009 -0.012
Elected state executives (Difference in effects) [0.61] [2.37]** [2.99]*** [1.71] [2.67]** [1.36] [2.00]** [1.52] [1.16] [1.93]* [0.54] [3.05]*** [0.74] [3.25]***
Elected state executives -0.065 0.944 1.314 0.479 0.726 17.565 47.246 25.304 0.526 1.965 -20.312 2.817 0.171 0.413
[0.05] [1.76]* [2.03]* [1.24] [1.42] [1.02] [1.70]* [1.20] [1.54] [1.62] [1.67] [1.70] [0.67] [4.63]***
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 2.039 0.944 0.797 0.599 0.752 6.123 31.938 21.317 0.230 -0.231 7.399 0.956 -0.138 -0.950
[1.67] [3.51]*** [2.68]** [3.45]*** [2.93]*** [1.49] [3.56]*** [3.01]*** [2.52]** [0.63] [0.63] [1.43] [0.88] [18.23]***
Democratic traditions 0.148 -0.003 -0.083 0.112 0.018 0.553 2.215 0.335 -0.011 -0.064 -0.134 0.535 0.033 0.019
[1.20] [0.06] [1.10] [3.69]*** [0.30] [0.37] [0.74] [0.17] [0.36] [0.67] [0.11] [2.80]** [1.20] [2.70]**
Current level of democracy -0.065 0.031 0.088 0.0016 0.056 -0.488 -1.637 -0.756 0.009 -0.034 3.051 -1.019 0.135 -0.223
[0.73] [0.58] [1.38] [0.06] [1.19] [0.66] [0.89] [0.58] [0.48] [0.52] [0.58] [1.25] [0.98] [4.03]***
Logarithm (Fertility) -1.743
[2.59]**
Logarithm (Population) -0.214 -0.158 -0.212 -0.044 -0.090 -3.034 -5.818 -1.330 -0.062 -0.038
[0.90] [0.95] [1.09] [0.40] [0.61] [1.11] [1.02] [0.36] [1.14] [0.17]
Share of protestant 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.011 0.005 -0.119 -0.171 0.173 -0.005 -0.003
[1.29] [2.13]** [1.89]* [2.36]** [0.73] [0.99] [0.64] [0.58] [1.58] [0.42]
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  -0.575 -0.601 -0.904 -0.557 -0.291 -21.879 -55.302 -19.204 -0.177 -1.199
[0.27] [0.91] [1.29] [1.42] [0.49] [1.88]* [2.29]** [1.11] [0.58] [1.36]
Latitude 0.682 -1.508 -2.767 0.612 -0.424 1.686 -87.267 -43.174 -0.179 -1.002
[0.18] [0.69] [0.90] [0.42] [0.20] [0.05] [0.95] [0.93] [0.22] [0.34]
English legal origin 0.000 0.275 0.000 -0.030 0.000 1.653 -30.597 -17.307 0.382 0.343 -2.399 -1.639 -0.395 -0.155
[.] [0.74] [.] [0.10] [.] [0.19] [1.80]* [1.33] [2.02]** [0.44] [0.33] [1.90]* [3.55]*** [1.98]*
Socialist legal origin -0.796 0.000 -0.419 0.000 -0.072 5.703 -27.358 -14.963 0.321 -2.904
[0.78] [.] [1.07] [.] [0.18] [0.66] [1.76]* [1.27] [1.92]* [3.88]***
French legal origin 0.496 0.712 0.614 0.563 0.385 -6.805 -35.564 -21.510 0.096 -0.335





Observations 29 37 37 37 37 70 70 64 70 70 22 22 21 22
Number of countries
R-squared 0.82 0.87 0.54 0.96
Subnational revenue share in adjacent 
regressions -0.007 -0.021 -0.039 -0.036 -0.038 -1.159 -1.216 -0.922 -0.008 -0.076 0.544 0.010 0.007 0.001
(Effect for elected  state executives) [0.09] [0.71] [1.34] [1.43] [1.62] [1.38] [1.19] [1.31] [0.52] [2.09]** [2.36]** [0.41] [1.92]* [0.23]
Panel A. Subsample of developing and transition countries
Panel B. Subsample of developed 
countries
Public goods and Growth±  Public goods and Growth Quality of Government
 
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. In cross-country 
regressions for developed countries, the number of control variables is decreased to provide additional degrees of freedom (section 5.1). 
± There are no significant results for the quality of government in developed countries. 
  40Table 4. Municipal executives appointed/elected, cross-section








































































































































































































































































Subnational revenue share 0.047 0.652 2.206 1.545 0.029 0.064 -0.031 0.622 0.122 0.028 0.004
(Effect for appointed municipal executives) [0.80] [0.61] [1.37] [1.36] [1.62] [1.36] [1.55] [2.10]* [3.95]*** [5.12]*** [2.06]*
CROSSTERM: Subnational revenue share &
Elected municipal execut-s (Difference in effects) -0.048 -1.626 -2.063 -1.853 -0.026 -0.097 0.036 -0.113 -0.100 -0.022 -0.002
[1.79]* [1.77]* [1.23] [1.31] [1.27] [1.94]* [1.86]* [0.33] [3.50]*** [4.52]*** [1.11]
Elected municipal executives 1.328 16.043 46.790 32.748 0.562 1.493 -0.951 -6.698 2.150 0.356 0.229
[1.04] [0.89] [1.67] [1.35] [1.72]* [1.81]* [1.67] [0.59] [2.54]** [1.91]* [4.11]***
Logarithm (GDP per capita) 0.343 3.657 24.953 19.478 0.215 -0.383 0.067 1.674 0.487 -0.147 -0.962
[2.06]** [0.85] [3.44]*** [2.97]*** [2.21]** [1.63] [0.09] [0.15] [0.62] [0.86] [17.23]***
Democratic traditions -0.003 0.723 4.764 1.536 0.012 0.024 -0.078 0.557 0.662 0.039 0.032
[0.04] [0.61] [2.88]*** [0.95] [0.53] [0.57] [1.04] [0.48] [2.65]** [1.20] [2.63]**
Current level of democracy 0.026 0.331 -2.327 -0.923 -0.005 0.008 -4.46 -0.264 0.122 -0.027
[0.74] [0.34] [1.61] [0.62] [0.29] [0.14] [0.61] [0.40] [1.18] [0.61]
Logarithm (Fertility) -1.109
[2.42]**
Logarithm (Population) -0.170 1.369 -4.859 0.220 -0.061 0.158 0.012
[0.58] [0.34] [1.09] [0.07] [1.07] [1.08] [0.22]
Share of protestant 0.020 0.105 -0.162 0.169 0.000 0.007 -0.001
[2.68]** [0.55] [0.52] [0.40] [0.12] [0.82] [0.44]
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  -1.186 -17.937 -49.755 -18.863 -0.311 -1.225
[1.75]* [1.15] [1.76]* [0.72] [0.80] [1.63]
Latitude -3.125 41.253 -51.907 -18.406 -0.208 1.330 0.781
[0.90] [0.87] [0.86] [0.48] [0.33] [0.64] [1.30]
English legal origin 0.000 11.459 -33.554 -11.271 0.359 0.421 -10.275 -2.213 -0.406 -0.118
[.] [0.87] [1.58] [0.53] [1.27] [0.60] [1.55] [3.11]*** [2.20]** [1.56]
Socialist legal origin -0.193 15.064 -24.120 -13.774 0.346 -2.080
[0.35] [1.48] [2.48]** [1.54] [2.49]** [6.49]***
French legal origin -0.188 13.980 -31.806 -13.598 0.179 0.378 -0.693





Observations 42 70 70 63 70 70 20 21 21 20 21
Number of countries
R-squared 0.58 0.46 0.75 0.56 0.94
Subnational revenue share in adjacent 
regressions -0.001 -1.197 -0.104 -0.434 0.000 -0.045 0.005 0.544 0.010 0.007 0.001
(Effect for elected  municipal executives) [0.02] [1.63] [0.14] [0.62] [0.00] [1.57] [0.65] [2.36]** [0.41] [1.92]* [0.23]
Panel B. Developed countries
Quality of Government, Public goods and Growth Quality of Government, Public goods and Growth
 
Note: Absolute values of robust t-statistics in parenthesis. *** - significant at 1% level;** - significant at 5% level;* - significant at 10% level. In cross-country 
regressions for developed countries, the number of control variables is decreased to provide additional degrees of freedom (section 5.1). 
± There are no significant results with measures of quality of government except for the government effectiveness index in developed countries subsample. 
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  43APPENDIX 
Table A1. Countries included in the sample 











































































Subsample of developed countries 
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Share of revenues of all subnational governments in total revenues of consolidated central 
budget measured in percents.  Scale from 0 to 100.  Source: Database on Fiscal 
Indicators, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics.  Data from 
Government Finance Statistics 2001 was added.  For Armenia, Korea, and Pakistan data 
were added using information from national statistical offices. 
Subnational expenditure 
share 
Share of expenditures of all subnational governments (net of transfers to other levels of 
government) in total expenditures of consolidated central budget measured in percents.  
Scale from 0 to 100.  Source: Database on Fiscal Indicators
40, by the World Bank, based 
on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics.  Data from Government Finance Statistics 2001 
was added.  For Armenia, Korea, and Pakistan data were added using information from 
national statistical offices. 
Fractionalization of 
government parties 
The probability that two members of parliament picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties.  Missing if there is no parliament, if there 
are any government parties where seats are unknown or if there are no parties in the 
legislature.  Scale from 0 to 1.  Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 3, 
(Beck et al., 2001). 
Fractionalization of 
parliament  
The probability that two members of parliament picked at random from the legislature will 
be of different parties.  Missing if there is no parliament, if there are no parties in the 
legislature and if any government or opposition party seats are missing.  Scale from 0 to 1.  
Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 3 (Beck et al., 2001). 
Party age  This is the average of the ages of the first government party, second government party, 
and 1st opposition party, or the subset of these for which age of party is known. The 
variable is measured in thousands of years. Source: Database on Political Institutions, 
Version 3 (Beck et al., 2001). 
Elected municipal 
executives 
Equals one if local executive is locally elected.  Equals zero otherwise.   No information, 
or no evidence of municipal governments, is recorded as missing.   If one source has 
information on a specific period, and the other has no information on a different period, 
we do not extrapolate from one source to another - no information is always recorded as 
missing.   If there are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the lowest 
level as the “municipal” level.   Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 3 
(Beck et al., 2001), updated using Nickson (1995) and various other sources. 
Elected state/province 
executives 
Equals one if state/province executive is locally elected.  Equals zero otherwise.   If there 
are multiple levels of sub-national government, we consider the highest level as the 
“state/province” level.  Indirectly elected state/province governments, where directly 
elected municipal bodies elect the state/province level, are not considered locally elected.  
Indirectly elected state/province governments elected by directly elected state/province 
bodies are considered locally elected.  Source: Database on Political Institutions, Version 
3 (Beck et al., 2001), updated using Nickson (1995) and various other sources. 
Continued. 
 
                                                 
40 Database can be found at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/de centralization/dataondecen.htm. 
 
  45Table A2.  Continued. 
Variable Description 
Control over corruption  A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain,  of a 
large number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-
governmental organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 
and 2001.  Units range from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 




A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality 
of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures and the credibility 
of government’s commitment to policies of a large number of survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 and 2001.  Units range from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.  
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
Regulation quality  A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perception of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas 
such as foreign trade and business development of a large number of survey respondents 
in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 and 2001.  Units range from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.  
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
Rule of law  A governance indicator that reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the 
incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts of a large number of survey respondents in 
industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
commercial risk rating agencies, and think-tanks during 2000 and 2001.  Units range from 
about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.  
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). 
Corruption indices  The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indexes for years 2000 and 2001 
respectively.  Scale from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes.   Source: Transparency International
42
Immunization  Immunization, DPT (% of children under 12 months).  Child immunization measures the 
rate of vaccination coverage of children under one year of age.  A child is considered 
adequately immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or whooping cough), and tetanus 
(DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine.  Scale from 0 to 100.  Source: World 
Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Infant mortality  Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 
1000 live births in a given year.  Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the 
World Bank 
Illiteracy  Adult illiteracy rate is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who cannot, with 
understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.  Scale from 
0 to 100.  Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Pupil to teacher ratio  Primary  school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary school 
divided by the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their teaching 
assignment).  Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Continued. 
                                                 
41 Paper can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters2.pdf. 
42 Indices can be found at http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/. 
  46Table A2.  Continued. 
Variable Description 
Fixed investments  Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP).  Gross fixed capital formation (gross domestic 
fixed investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings.  According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also 
considered capital formation.   Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World 
Bank 
GDP per capita, PPP  GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP).  PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.  An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S.  dollar has in the 
United States.  GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products.  It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  Data are in current international 
dollars.  Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Population    Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship-except for refugees not permanently 
settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of 
their country of origin.  Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Openness   Error term from the linear regression of the share of export and import in GDP (measured 
in percent) on the area and population of the country.  Source: Constructed based on data 
from World Development Indicators 2001, by the World Bank 
Fertility  Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she 
were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates Source: World Development Indicators 2001, by the 
World Bank 
Current level of  
democracy 
Index of democracy.  Scale from 0 to 10 with higher values corresponding to more 
democratic outcomes.  Source: Polity IV Dataset. 
Democratic traditions   Average index of democracy for the last 50 years.  Scale from 0 to 10 with higher values 
corresponding to more democratic outcomes.  Source: constructed based on data from 
Polity IV Dataset. 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization for the year 1985.  Its value ranges from 0 to 1.  
Source: Roeder, P. G. (2001).
43
Share of protestants   Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the Protestant 
religion in 1980.  Scales from 0 to 100.  Source: La Porta et al.  (1999). 
Latitude  The absolute latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1.  Source: La 
Porta et al.  (1999). 
Legal origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of the country.  There 
are five possible origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) 
German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; (5) Socialist/Communist 
laws.  Source: La Porta et al.  (1999). 
                                                 
43 Philip Roeder, G. (2001). "Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985," February 16. The index 
can be found at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm. 
  47Variable # of obs Mean SD Min Max
Share of subnational expenditures 83 17.74 14.94 1.74 68.31
Share of subnational revenues 84 15.08 14.23 1.07 66.96
Municipal executives elected 124 0.51 0.46 0 1
State executives elected 141 0.17 0.34 0 1
Fractionalization of governing parties 155 0.39 0.3 0 1
Fractionalization of parliament 155 0.18 0.24 0 1
Fractionalization of opposition parties 121 0.48 0.26 0 1
Average age of main parties 142 0.02 0.02 0 0.15
Level of  DPT immunization 178 68.6 19.94 14.18 99.75
Negative of logarithm of infant mortality 180 -3.66 0.82 -5.19 -1.95
Negative of illiteracy level 135 -31.44 24.52 -89.38 -0.2
Negative of logarithm of pupil to teacher ratio 167 -3.32 0.39 -4.21 -2.26
Transparency International index of corruption 
for the year 2001 68 3.72 1.64 0.4 9.5
Transparency International index of corruption 
for the year 2000 67 3.68 1.56 1.2 9.1
Index of government effectiveness 137 -0.25 0.77 -2.34 2.16
Index of regulation quality 146 -0.16 0.82 -2.95 1.82
Index of control over corruption  138 -0.27 0.7 -1.47 2.13
Index of rule of law 147 -0.23 0.76 -2.17 1.85
Share of subnational expenditures 22 28.7 14.51 4.06 57.68
Share of subnational revenues 22 21.17 14.41 3.11 52.36
Municipal executives elected 22 0.82 0.39 0 1
State executives elected 23 0.59 0.49 0 1
Fractionalization of governing parties 23 0.67 0.1 0.48 0.83
Fractionalization of parliament 23 0.29 0.24 0 0.74
Fractionalization of opposition parties 23 0.46 0.21 0.003 0.85
Average age of main parties 23 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.14
Level of  DPT immunization 23 83.88 12.87 46.44 99
Negative of logarithm of infant mortality 23 -2.14 0.26 -2.78 -1.74
Negative of logarithm of pupil to teacher ratio 22 -2.75 0.34 -3.27 -1.91
Transparency International index of corruption 
for the year 2001 23 7.87 1.39 4.2 9.9
Transparency International index of corruption 
for the year 2000 23 7.89 1.51 4.6 10
Index of government effectiveness 23 1.47 0.38 0.65 1.93
Index of regulation quality 23 1.05 0.29 0.58 1.5
Index of control over corruption  23 1.61 0.48 0.63 2.25
Index of rule of law 23 1.52 0.36 0.62 1.91
Table A3.  Summary statistics for the measures of fiscal decentralization, political 
institutions, and dependent variables (average values for counties are summarized)
Subsample of developing and transition countries
Subsample of developed countries
























































































































































































Share of subnational revenues 0.956
a
Municipal executives elected -0.052 -0.178
State executives elected -0.016 -0.107 0.434
a
Fractionalization of parliament  -0.045 -0.057 0.174
c 0.014
Fractionalization of governing parties -0.05 -0.055 0.029 -0.061 0.773
a
Average age of main parties 0.007 -0.038 -0.018 0.082 -0.183
b -0.193
b
Share of subnational revenues 0.943
a
Municipal executives elected 0.339 0.334
State executives elected 0.417
c 0.352 0.550
a
Fractionalization of parliament 0.085 0.006 -0.206 -0.408
c
Fractionalization of governing parties 0.112 0.074 -0.194 -0.364
c 0.899
a




Table A4.  Correlation coefficients of the indicators of .developing and transition countries          
(for average country values)
 a- significant at 1% level; b- significant at 5% level; c- significant at 10% level
Subsample of developing and transition countries
Subsample of developed countries
 





























































































































Fractionalization of government parties 2 5.8 14.5 3.7
Age of main parties 6.9 5.6 46.3 5.1
Municipal executives elected 3 2.7 4.2 1.5
State executives elected 42 11 27.7 4.5
Fractionalization of government parties 3.6 8.8 0.4 13.5
Age of main parties 0.03 10.1 2.4 13.7
Municipal executives elected 3 10.7 5.9 16.5
State executives elected 4 2.4 8.5 8.6
Government quality
Public goods and 
growth
Subsample of developing and transition countries
Subsample of developed countries
    





























































































































































































































































































































gov_frac* rev_dec - -*** -*** -** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** -*** 0 + 00
party_age* rev_dec 0 +* +* +** +** +*** +* +*** ++ + * * * 00 +***
gov_frac* rev_dec 00000 0 -** 0N / A - 0 0N / A-***
party_age* rev_dec -*** -* - -** -** -** 0 -*** N/A 0 -** - N/A +
state_elect* rev_dec 0 -** -*** - -** -* - -** - - 0 +* +** +***
muni_elect* rev_dec 00-* 00 -* -* - - - 000 +***
state_elect* rev_dec 00000-*** 0 -*** N/A 0 0 -** N/A +*
muni_elect* rev_dec + +* + 0 +-0 -*** N/A -*** + + N/A +***



































































Note: Zeros represent coefficients with t-statistics smaller than unity; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%
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